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All About That Place: The Curious Case of Bingo Liberalisation
in Brazil
TONI WILLIAMS
Le bingo est une forme de jeu souvent associée aux bonnes œuvres, aux services sociaux,
au divertissement à faibles enjeux et à la sociabilité de la classe ouvrière. Dans bon
nombre de pays dans le monde, les salles de bingo relèvent d’œuvres de bienfaisance, de
clubs d’anciens combattants, de femmes âgées et de familles, mais pas au Brésil. Le
Bingo commercial y a connu une forte croissance pendant une décennie de légalité qui a
pris fin en 2004. Les salles de bingo légales employaient des dizaines de milliers de
personnes. Majoritairement des Brésiliens et Brésiliennes de la classe moyenne et de
bonne éducation y jouaient, ainsi que des femmes et des hommes âgés de la classe
ouvrière. Toutefois, le jeu, ou plutôt les salles dans lesquelles les gens y jouaient se sont
transformées en blanchisseries d’argent sale, en sources de corruption des pouvoirs
publics et en risques pour la sécurité des quartiers urbains. Au moyen d’une analyse
sociojuridique contextualisée des lieux que sont devenus les salles de bingo brésiliennes
et de la place qu’elles occupent dans la société brésilienne, cet article suggère qu’il peut
être intéressant de se pencher sur le rôle qu’occupe le Brésil dans un contexte de
mondialisation afin de comprendre pourquoi la législation et réglementation brésiliennes
n’ont pas réussi à institutionnaliser les salles de bingo commerciales pour en faire des
lieux amusants, sécuritaires et sains en vue d’atténuer les risques qu’elles posaient et
d’assurer la pérennité du bingo en tant que loisir légal.
Bingo is a form of gaming that is often associated with good works, social services, low
stakes entertainment, and working-class sociality. In many parts of the world bingo halls
are the province of charities, veterans’ clubs, older women, and families: But not in
Brazil. Commercial bingo grew rapidly in Brazil during a decade of legality that ended
in 2004. Legal bingo halls employed tens of thousands of people and the game was
widely played by middle-class and well-educated Brazilians as well as older workingclass women and men. However, the game, or more precisely the bingo halls in which it
was played, came to be regarded as laundries for dirty money, sources of corruption of
public powers, and risks to the security of urban neighbourhoods. Using contextualised
socio-legal analysis of the places that Brazilian bingo halls became and their place in
Brazilian society, this article suggests that it may be insightful to look to the place of
Brazil in a globalizing world to understand why Brazilian law and regulation failed to
institutionalise the commercial bingo hall as a site of clean, safe “fun,” to contain the
risks it posed, and to ensure the continuity of bingo as a legal leisure practice.
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to the editors, Alex, Donal and Kate for all of your work in bringing together this special issue and for your
comments and suggestions. The article benefited from careful reading by Iain Ramsay; and was significantly
improved by the incisive comments and suggestions of two anonymous reviewers and the perceptive, rigorous
and sensitive editing of the JLSP editors – thank you. All remaining errors and limitations are mine.
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BRAZIL OPENED UP A DOMESTIC MARKET FOR BINGO during the late-20th century wave
of gambling liberalisation across the non-Islamic world. It exempted the game from a
longstanding prohibition of privately owned gambling services and created an institutional
framework for the development and governance of bingo halls. In terms of sector growth,
participation and revenues, the legalisation of bingo succeeded. A large number of commercial
bingo halls sprang up across the country, especially in the large prosperous cities of Southern
Brazil; they remitted general taxes to the treasury of federal and state governments; they
supported the development of sports, and Brazilians of different social classes, genders and
generations, frequented the halls. Brazil’s governance framework for commercial bingo, by
contrast, seemingly failed. Despite repeated reforms to the legal architecture of its bingo
market, the state was unable to establish robust and sustainable regulatory arrangements to
contain the risks it perceived the bingo halls to create. Only seven years after opening up the
commercial bingo market, the federal government embarked on regulatory measures to close
it down. These measures met with defiance, resistance and repeated legal and political
challenges from bingo owners and managers, workers and players, but to no avail. By 2007,
less than fifteen years after legalisation, Brazil had, in effect, repealed the exemption from
prohibition and repositioned its bingo halls outside the law.
Brazil’s experience of bingo legalisation is unusual in a few respects. In many countries,
bingo is firmly associated with good works, social services, low-stakes entertainment, and
working-class female sociality and the bingo hall is the province of charities and churches,
veterans clubs, families, and older women. 1 Brazil’s bingo sector started with a social
dimension in the sense that the original justification for legalisation was to support the
development of sports and leisure. Once legalised, however, the bingo halls were engulfed in
scandals about organized crime, money laundering, and corruption. Within a few years of
legalization, the Brazilian bingo hall had acquired a reputation, akin to that which Skolnick
attributed to the US casino as “a most accessible … laundry for the vast quantities of dirty
money that accumulate annually … through skimming, bribery, corruption and crime.”2
A corollary to that reputation is Brazil’s distinctive framing of the principal risks that
bingo halls were perceived to pose and the harms that their regulation failed to control in terms
of criminality risks to state, culture and society from corruption, criminal networks and money
laundering. While the containment of criminality risk is a conventional justification for
gambling regulation in many jurisdictions, it is unusual for popular and policy discourse to
associate this risk so strongly with the game of bingo as occurred in Brazil. Relatedly, the
prominence given to criminality risk in Brazil tended to displace concerns about risks to player
health and financial security that feature so significantly in policy debates about gambling
regulation elsewhere.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the Brazilian state ended the process of liberalisation so
soon after starting it. Termination of the bingo market contradicts the reported tendency of
gambling liberalisation processes to gather momentum and become unstoppable. 3 It also
Kate Bedford, “Bingo Regulation and the Feminist Political Economy of Everyday Gambling: In Search of the
Anti-Heroic” (2016) 13:6 Globalizations 801–14.
2
Jerome Skolnick, House of Cards: legalization and control of casino gambling (Boston: Little Brown, 1978) at
47.
3
Peter Adams, Gambling, Freedom and Democracy (London: Routledge, 2008); Sytze Kingma, “Gambling and
the risk society: the liberalisation and legitimation crisis of gambling in the Netherlands” (2004) 4:1 International
Gambling Studies 47–67.
1
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conflicts with the treatment of Brazil’s most significant legal gambling modality, the stateowned lottery. Federal lottery games and playing opportunities proliferated in part through
government entrepreneurship and willingness to maintain a facilitative regulatory framework
illustrating that in Brazil—as Adams, Kingma and others have found elsewhere—the state can
become reliant on gambling revenues, implicated in expansion of the gambling economy and
invested in avoiding excessive disruption of the lucrative activity. 4 The rapid growth of
commercial bingo premises and business revenues after legalisation shows that Brazil’s
enabling regulatory framework did permit momentum to build and in that sense the case fits
the early stages—emergence and regulation—of the proliferation thesis, but the normalization
phase was never fully institutionalized.5 In the case of Brazil’s bingo halls, liberalisation was
not too strong to stop.
Stimulated by these observations—and noting in particular that popular and official
understandings of the Brazilian bingo hall as a site of corruption and source of criminality risk
arose from the game’s legalisation, not its prohibition—this article explores the apparent
unwillingness or inability of the Brazilian state to manage these risks and institutionalise the
commercial bingo hall as a lawful place. Working from the premise that it may not be useful
simply to view the state’s unwillingness or inability to manage criminality risk as a
consequence of regulatory inadequacies, potentially correctable through reform—because that
conclusion begs the question about why effective reform did not occur—this article asks how
did Brazil benefit from its swift reversion to illegality?
To answer that question, this article draws on case study research on Brazil’s regulation
of its bingo market. The data collected include twenty semi-structured interviews of individuals
with knowledge and experience of bingo in Brazil during and after legalization, including
players and former bingo owners, judges, lawyers, and public servants involved in law
enforcement, industry analysts, journalists and politicians, addiction researchers, and support
services providers. 6 These interviews were conducted by my research collaborator, Maria
Luiza Kurban Jobim, with individuals located in Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, the two
states that hosted the highest numbers of bingo businesses when bingo was legal; Rio de
Janeiro, a state that has a long tradition of popular gambling and is home to prominent gaming
industry analysts and lobbyists; and the Distrito Federal, the location of the nation’s capital and
seat of the Federal government which is responsible for gambling legislation. Other case study
data include legislative and regulatory texts on gambling regulation in Brazil, case law, data
and commentary published by the Commissão Parliamentar de Inquérito dos Bingos, (CPI dos
Bingos) a comprehensive federal inquiry into bingo in Brazil and secondary sources ranging
4

Supra note 3. In 2014, the total revenues from federal government lotteries were about R$13.5 billion, CAIXA
LOTERIAS (2014) A sorte em números, online: <http://www.caixa.gov.br/Downloads/caixaloterias/2014_A%20sorte%20em%20numeros.pdf> [perma.cc/M7KD-P8UK] at 50. This was more than three
times the R$4.1 billion annual revenue reported in the 2006 Parliamentary Inquiry into bingos, Relatório da
comissão parlamentar de inquérito referente ao relatório final da CPI: Bingos. Brasília, DF: Senado Federal,
2006, online < http://www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/bitstream/handle/id/82024/RelFinalBingos.pdf?sequence=11>
[perma.cc/HLN3-23Z3] > (hereinafter, CPI dos Bingos) 83. The Inquiry indicated that the Brazilian state benefits
proportionately more than others from the lottery because it pays out only one-third of its revenues in prizes
(retaining the remaining two-thirds for operating expenses, sports development purposes, cultural, development,
social security, prisons, and higher education) as compared to the 40-50% of revenues paid out by other national
lotteries, at 84.
5
Adams, supra note 3 at 33.
6
The research team did not directly observe or participate in any games because bingo halls were unlawful at the
time of this study.
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from newspaper archives through journal articles, websites, and blogs to PhD theses.7 These
data are analysed by reference to shifts in regulatory outputs, that is the regulatory instruments
and agents that the state deployed, rather than the party-political processes that produced the
changes.8
The article makes two main claims. First, that the business and property relations of
Brazil’s legalized bingo halls turned these places into channels for illicit funds to flow from
impugned sources and into arrangements that corrupted public powers. In this setting, the
reversion to illegality became a means to eliminate a point of access to state actors for criminal
networks. Second, the article suggests that at the turn of the 21st century the places that the
bingo halls had become—and the criminalised activities that they housed—were perceived not
only to threaten internal security, but also to jeopardise Brazil’s place in the world, that is, to
pose a risk to the country’s political aspirations for “soft power” and increased recognition as
a significant actor in the international economy.9 In relation to these aspirations, the Brazilian
state’s capacity to stake and enforce visible and meaningful boundaries between legal and
illegal practices potentially served to communicate important reputational information about
sovereignty and about its stance on international cooperation. Its use of the criminal instrument
to reposition the bingo house as unlawful thus allowed Brazil to demonstrate, at one and the
same time, sovereign powers of control within its own territory, including the power to manage
internal security and to discipline its markets; and, somewhat paradoxically, its integration into
a global economy that demands even of powerful states compliance with increasingly stringent
and intrusive requirements to monitor financial flows and manage the risks that they pose.
Part I summarises the development of the Brazilian bingo market as a social and
economic institution after legalisation of the game in 1993. After a brief introduction to the
prohibition era context of gambling practice, this part discusses where legal bingo halls were
established, who used them, and the kinds of places they became. Part II describes the
governance of commercial bingo in Brazil through the legal and regulatory provisions that
initially enabled and then suppressed the bingo hall. Part III explores the international political
economy context of the Brazilian state’s resort to criminalisation to dismantle an apparently
successful industry. It outlines the contradictory effects of a nascent political-economic order
that fed Brazil’s ambitions for international influence and the concurrent rise of a normative
order governing transnational financial flows that imposed stringent demands on Brazil to
manage the very risks that its bingo houses seemingly exacerbated. Reflecting on the tensions
and contradictory effects of these orders, the article concludes that the repositioning of the
bingo hall as a criminalised space enabled the state to demonstrate an ability to respond robustly
7

More details on the case study can be found at Kate Bedford et al, The Bingo Project Report: Rethinking
Gambling
Regulation,
online:
<kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject/resources/Bingo_Project_report_final.pdf>
[perma.cc/RC8Q-KY24]. Sections of this article are taken from the text of the project report, but the argument
and analysis are new.
8
For an outline of some of the interests at play in debates over bingo regulation in Brazil, see Maria Luiza Kurban
Jobim and Toni Williams, “Chance Developments: bingo regulation in Brazil” (2017) Revista Análise Econômica
35, online: <seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/AnaliseEconomica/issue/view/2992> [perma.cc/2VET-MPXQ] 103–19. For
detailed discussion of the political interests engaged by gambling regulation debates in Brazil, see Matthew Vaz,
The Jackpot Mentality: The Growth of Government Lotteries and the Suppression of Illegal Numbers Gambling
in Rio de Janeiro and New York City (PhD thesis, Columbia University, 2011) [unpublished].
9
Joseph Nye, “Soft power” (1990) 80 Foreign policy 153–171; on Brazil’s aspirations, see for example, Harold
Trinkunas, “Brazil's Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance” (2014) Latin America Initiative, online:
<calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/43088/Trinkunas_Brazils_Rise_2014.pdf> [perma.cc/VC3K-6JLK];
Larry Rohter, Brazil on the Rise: the story of a country transformed (Palgrave: New York, 2012).
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to a home-grown risk in ways that comport with international priorities about disrupting
impugned financial flows. As such, the reversion to criminalization of the bingo hall potentially
contributed to Brazil advancing or at least protecting its international standing in the global
economy.

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRAZILIAN BINGO HALL
A. GAMBLING UNDER PROHIBITION IN BRAZIL
Bingo was legalised in Brazil as an exemption to the suppression of gambling that had been
enacted in the 1940s under Presidents Getúlio Vargas and Gaspar Dutra. 10 The 1946 law,
sponsored by President Dutra, justified the suppression of gambling by reference to universal
values, shared internationally, and Brazil’s cultural, moral, and religious traditions.11 Then, as
now, relationships between Brazilian politics, religion, social morality, and cultural practice,
were complex and contradictory. Described recently as both the “most Catholic” and the “most
Pentecostal” country in the world, 12 formally, Brazil had no established state religion after
1890, the advent of the first Republic. During the early 1940s, however, when the country was
internationally-renowned for its flourishing casinos, it was also in the grip of a powerful
NeoChristendom movement that sought to re-establish the Catholic Church at the heart of the
Brazilian state.13 Its project to “re-Catholiciz[e] Brazil from the top down”14 was articulated at
the inauguration of Rio’s famous Corcovado statue (Christ the Redeemer) when the
Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro issued an ultimatum to President Vargas that “either the State …
will recognize the God of the people or the people will not recognize the State.”15 The same
project is implicit in the justification of President Dutras’ prohibition legislation in terms of
Brazil’s religious traditions.
Suppression of the gambling economy was resisted by casino owners through legal
challenges that sought exemptions from the legislation and extensions of licences, but the
10

Decreto-Lei no 3.688/1941 & Decreto-Lei no 9.215/ 1946. Brasília, DF, 1946. (Coleção de Leis do Brasil, v.
3). Gambling offences were classified as contraventions (roughly equivalent to misdemeanours) rather than
serious crimes, so that convictions carried less moral turpitude than Criminal Code offences and penalties were
less harsh.
11
Decreto-Lei No 9.215/1946, Preamble.
12
Rudolph von Sinner, “Pentecostalism and Citizenship in Brazil: Between Escapism and Dominance” (2012) 6:1
International Journal of Public Theology 99–117 at 102.
13
Darién Davis discusses Brazil’s successful casino sector of the 1930s in Darien Davis, White Face, Black Mask:
Africaneity and the Early Social History of Popular Music in Brazil (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University
Press, 2009).
14
Ralph Della Cava, “Catholicism and society in twentieth-century Brazil” (1976) 11:2 Latin American Research
Review 7–50 at 11. Religion continues to exert a significant influence over many aspects of Brazilian politics and
culture today. Catholicism, Pentecostalism and other charismatic traditions and Syncreticism are still widely
practiced. More than 90 per cent of Brazilians are religiously affiliated and religious leaders are culturally
influential in some respects. They also wield political power: five out of thirty-two official political parties are
religious and, while most of these parties are small in terms of the number of representatives in the legislature,
under Brazil’s highly fragmented and individualized electoral system, they frequently are able to bargain for
socially conservative policies. There is longstanding hostility towards the animal game, Brazil’s popular illegal
numbers game—and the entrepreneurs who run it—amongst religious leaders, but religious opposition to bingo
did not emerge as a significant theme in our interviews. The case study does not explore the reasons for this
difference but it is worth noting that Catholic and Pentecostal churches offer non-commercial bingo games to
raise funds for buildings and social projects, which could account for a less hostile stance towards the game.
15
Ibid at 14.
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legislation made lawful private-sector provision of popular gambling services impossible.
While the legislation destroyed the formal casino sector as intended, the scope of prohibition
was never all-encompassing in terms of the law in the books or in practice: for example, poker
was de facto exempted from the legislation because it was defined as a game of skill and ontrack betting was allowed through private clubs.16
Mass-participation gambling in Brazil also continued in two forms after prohibition:
legal lottery games offered by the public sector and Brazil’s privately-provided illegal numbers
game, the jogo do bicho (“animal game”).17 Both flourished throughout the 20th century and
remain popular today, with the federal lottery operator reporting annual revenue of R$13.5
billion in 2014 and the jogo do bicho reportedly generating an estimated R$12 billion in extralegal revenues for its entrepreneurs.18 Building on their ownership of illegal gambling services,
entrepreneurs of the jogo do bicho numbers game often consolidated local power bases through
investments in social, political and cultural activities, including the Samba Schools that parade
during Carnival and local services in underserved favelas, as well as in petty corruption.19 In
addition to their involvement in the illicit gambling that continued in Brazil throughout the
prohibition era, some of these entrepreneurs reputedly are heavily engaged in other illegal
trades, including narcotics and firearms trafficking within and beyond Brazil.20

B. THE BRAZILIAN BINGO HALL 1993-2006
After legalization opened the market in 1993, bingo halls were established in every one of
Brazil’s twenty-six states and the Distrito Federal, but they were unevenly distributed across
the country. By the early 2000s, the regulator, the Caixa Econômica Federal (CAIXA), had
issued licences for 924 bingo halls, half (468) of which were located in São Paulo, Brazil’s
largest and richest state, with another 140 bingo halls (15 per cent of all bingo businesses)
located in Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil’s fourth richest state. The remaining five states of Brazil’s
prosperous South and South East regions together hosted 183 bingo halls, about 20 per cent of
the total. According to the CAIXA data, 87 per cent of the country’s bingo businesses were
located in its wealthiest states, as compared to an estimated 57 per cent of Brazil’s population.21
By contrast, seven states clustered in Brazil’s poorest region, the North, together hosted fewer
than twenty bingo businesses, just two per cent of the total. Southern Brazil then, as now, was
Eduardo Mahon, “Poker não deve ser considerado contravenção” (2011) Consultor Jurídico, online:
<conjur.com.br/2011-jan-23/habilidade-jogador-decisiva-ganho- jogo-poker> [perma.cc/CJ4B-LWRU].
17
This privately-run lottery game that traces its origins to the marketing of the first zoo in Rio de Janeiro during
the 1890s has been extremely popular in Brazil, since its inception, despite being positioned almost entirely
outside the law. See Amy Chazkel, Laws of Chance: Brazil’s Clandestine Lottery and the Making of Urban Public
Life in Brazil (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011) for a rich and insightful historical and socio-legal
anthropology of the development of the jogo do bicho; Vaz, supra note 8 offers a rich account of contemporary
developments.
18
A sorte em numeros, supra note 4; Samantha Pearson, “Brazil hopes gambling will reverse its fortunes:
Government eyes tax revenues to plug country’s budget deficit” Financial Times (5 September 2016) online:
<ft.com/content/646bac98-6d72-11e6-a0c9-1365ce54b926>.
19
See generally, Michel Misse, “Mercados ilegais, redes de proteção e organização local do crime no Rio de
Janeiro” (2007) 21:61 Estudos avançados 139–157. For extensive commentary on the work of bicheiros as social
and cultural services entrepreneurs, see Vaz, supra note 8.
20
Mac Margolis, “Brazilian Authorities Link Lottery to Political Corruption” Los Angeles Times (9 April 1994)
online: <articles.latimes.com/1994-04-09/news/mn-43915_1_brazilian-authorities> [perma.cc/78SY-URHE];
See also discussion in Vaz, supra note 8 at 393, 400–04.
21
“2000
Census
estimates”
Instituto
Brasileiro
de
Geografia
e
Estatística,
online:
<ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/censo2000/primeiros_resultados_amostra/tabela_regioes.shtm>
[perma.cc/5SKJ-YYNH].
16
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much more populous than the North, but, as Table 1 below shows, the distribution of bingos
was considerably more skewed towards prosperous regions and states than was the distribution
of the population.
A study conducted by the CPI dos Bingos during the mid-2000s located more bingo
businesses (1547) across the country than had the regulator, with notably higher numbers in
poorer states. It too showed substantial regional disparity, however, as the number of bingos in
the North (29) and North East (184) regions, home to an estimated 35 per cent of Brazil’s
population, amounted to less than 15 per cent of the total, while two-thirds (68 per cent) of
bingos were concentrated in four states in the South and South East where two-fifths (42 per
cent) of the population live. These data confirm that the state of São Paulo hosted the largest
number of bingo halls (595), although, at 38 per cent, its share of the total number of businesses
was smaller than the CAIXA data had indicated and somewhat less disproportionate to its 22
per cent share of the Brazilian population. With 224 bingos, the state of Rio Grande Do Sul
again hosted the second largest number of bingos and in this study, its share amounted to about
15 per cent of the total number of bingo businesses in the country, about two and one-half times
its share of the Brazilian population.
Table 1: Distribution of population and bingo businesses in Brazil, early 2000s
Region

Share of Brazil’s
population in 2000 (%) **

Share of licenced bingo
businesses recorded by
regulator (%)*

Share of bingo halls
estimated by Commission
of Inquiry (%)*

North

7.6

1.9

2.5

North East

28

8.9

11.9

South East

42

62.3

53.4

State of São Paulo

21.8

50.6

38.5

South

15

23.2

26.1

State of Rio Grande do Sul

5.9

15.1

14.5

Central West

6.8

3.4

6

* Percentages calculated from data reported in the CPI dos Bingos
** Percentages calculated from 2000 census estimates, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e
Estatística,
online:
<ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/censo2000/primeiros_resultados_amostra/tabela_r
egioes.shtm> [perma.cc/5SKJ-YYNH].
Bingo halls generated substantial business revenues recorded officially at almost R$390
million in 2001 and 2002.22 But this figure substantially understates annual receipts according
to the sector’s regulator. Indeed, the CAIXA estimated that only about 10-20 per cent of bingo
hall revenues had been reported.23 About 20 per cent of the revenues that the regulator collected
in 2001 and 2002 were remitted to specific purposes including the funding of Sports
22
23

CPI dos Bingos, supra note 4 at 105.
Ibid.
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Federations (7 per cent), the ministry of Sports (4.5 per cent) and Brazil’s Olympic Committee
(1-2 per cent) and funding of the regulator itself (7 per cent).24 Additional tax revenue from
bingo halls was raised through general taxes on salaries and profits and specific taxes for
designated purposes.
Many Brazilians patronised the bingo halls during their heyday with a 2006 national
opinion survey reporting that 15 per cent of the population had attended a bingo hall at least
once.25 Men (20 per cent) were twice as likely as women (10 per cent) to report having attended
a bingo hall, and men (at 23 per cent) were more likely than women (16 per cent) to favour
legalisation of bingo halls and slot-machines though, men and women were equally likely
(about half of those surveyed) to oppose it.26
Adults of all age groups frequented the bingo halls with those aged 20-39 being just as
likely to report having played there as those in their 50s and 60s. Twenty-three per cent of the
population with the highest level of formal education reported having visited a bingo hall as
compared to only 9 per cent of the least formally educated; and those with the highest incomes
(28 per cent) were more than twice as likely as the lowest income earners (12 per cent) to report
to have gone to a bingo hall.27
Contemporaneous newspaper stories and visits to working bingos that were reported in
the CPI dos Bingos indicate (consistent with recollections of interviewees in this case study)
that many legalised bingo halls targeted middle-aged and affluent people, promoting bingo as
a sophisticated leisure option and developing the premises as a conducive environment for both
relaxation and business networking. For example, Zero Hora, a newspaper based in Rio Grande
do Sul, the state with the most disproportionately large share of bingos, contrasted a recentlyestablished bingo hall that had “a carpeted environment filled with mirrors, full of electronic
equipment and waiters in ties serving imported whisky” with the former image of a bingo hall
“… [as] a common room with long tables, dining chairs, straw on the floor and underpaid
workers trying to have fun or earn some money without spending a lot,” concluding that under
legalization, “bingo has become a chic leisure option.”28 The same newspaper quotes the proud
boast of a director of a large bingo hall in Porto Alegre, that his bingo hall “bring[s] together
people representing 90% of the [state’s] GDP.”29
Some bingo halls invested substantially in decor and fittings to convey opulence,
glamour, and excess. One respondent reminisced that a well-known bingo hall in his city “was
famous for being one of the most luxurious places in the city … the first time I went it was a
beautiful place with lovely chairs and tables made of marble.”30 Similarly, researchers working
on behalf of the CPI dos Bingos observed of Bingo Imperatriz in São Paulo that its
“sumptuousness is easy to see even from the outside, which is adorned with plenty of light and
statues of African figures. The luxurious interior is impressive. There is carpeting all over the
24

Ibid.
Ibid at Anexo II-D, table 19.
26
Ibid at Table 18.
27
Ibid at Table 19.
28
Solano Nascimento, “Bingo vira forma chique de lazer” Zero Hora (12 November 1994). In this comment the
speaker appears to compare the new high-end bingo halls that had recently emerged with the facilities opened in
1993 immediately after legalisation or it may be that the speaker intended to contrast the new bingo halls with
informal clandestine bingo facilities established under prohibition. The newspaper story is ambiguous.
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floor, an aquarium full of carp under a glass floor and the space is decorated with more than
100 statues.”31 Evidence that the Imperatriz had succeeded in reaching its target demographic
appears in the investigators’ report, which comments that judged by their cars, dress, and
comportment, the clientele of the Imperatriz came from Brazil’s wealthiest social classes.32
Most bingo halls, even those targeting the well-off, were more modestly appointed than
the Imperatriz, though still very comfortable. An observation of another São Paulo bingo hall
observes, for example, that despite also serving clients from the wealthiest social classes, the
Itaim “does not have the same luxury as Bingo Imperatriz; however, it is not a simple place
and it has its refinements. The entire floor is carpeted and the room where the card game of
bingo is played is as modern as the largest bingo hall in São Paulo.”33 Reporting on “the largest
and most luxurious” bingo hall in Florianópolis, in the Southern state of Santa Catarina, the
police investigators comment that although its “luxury, decoration and refinement do not
measure up to the best and most luxurious bingo halls in the city of São Paulo, its similarity
with the best bingos in São Paulo is the wall-to-wall carpeting.”34
Large, luxurious bingo halls catered to prosperous Brazilians. Other bingos, targeting
lower income people, were less well-appointed in terms of decor and furnishings. The manager
of a bingo hall in Porto Alegre commented that her business “with its plastic tables and chairs
and reusable cards mostly attracts the lower and middle classes … the public who really
understands bingo.”35 Another newspaper story about a plainly-outfitted bingo hall that offered
the lowest prices in the city of Porto Alegre, quotes the owner’s description of their clients as
“clients simples” (ordinary people).36 More modest bingo halls might be placed in shopping
malls and unlike the Imperatriz their exteriors could be quite nondescript: everyday
accessibility was part of the appeal.37 One interviewee recalled, for example, “a huge bingo on
two floors [that] gave us dinner, afternoon coffee … everything… One floor was only slot
machines, another floor was only card bingo. It was in a mall and always packed because the
people who worked at the mall played a lot.”38
Within a few years of the opening of the bingo market, the spatial segregation that this
comment alludes to between group-based bingo, played on cards, and individualised play in
rooms full of electronic game machines, had become typical of the Brazilian bingo hall.39
Businesses that served richer and poorer clienteles alike divided publicly-used space between
the well-lit, environments of comfortable rooms where people sat at tables shared space to play
the conventional card-based bingo game, and large dimly lit spaces stocked with hundreds of
electronic machines where individuals played alone.
Spatial separation of different gambling modalities mapped onto gender and generational
differences in how people used the premises. Although women and men at times occupied all
publicly-accessible places within the bingo hall, women generally were more likely to play
31
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card-based bingo and men tended to frequent the rooms housing electronic machines.40 Older
people were more likely to use the space dedicated to card games and younger ones to choose
the machines.41 Revenues from electronic gaming machines (EGMs) could be substantial with
the report of the CPI dos Bingos finding that “in São Paulo electronic gaming machines
represent 80 per cent of the profit from bingo halls, sometimes reaching 90 per cent.”42 Bingo
halls normally rented the machines, paying monthly an agreed share of the machines’ revenue
or (less frequently) a fixed rental per machine.43
Operating hours often differed between the two types of spaces: rooms housing machines
(and ATMs) might open for 20-24 hours per day, while those housing card-based play kept
shorter hours.44 Some bingo halls divide up usage by time to cater to players with different
desires, needs, and constraints. One former bingo owner described how he had tailored
advertising, refreshments, and incentives to different demographic groups to maximise
productive use of the place: during the day it attracted elderly people who wanted to socialise
with their friends; and in the early evening it targeted workers trying to avoid the city’s
notorious traffic jams. Later in the evening, the business was aimed at people who wished to
extend their leisure time after eating dinner; and in the early hours of the morning, it catered to
night workers such as security guards, and restaurant and bar managers who needed a place to
chill out after work.45
This overview of the Brazilian bingo hall under legalisation shows that these places
became popular and successful businesses in much of the country, catering to their local
communities through employment, consumption opportunities, and the provision of leisure
facilities. Electronic gaming machines of various types were integral to their development at
least in the major urban centres of the prosperous South and South East, leading the CPI dos
Bingos to observe that the prevalence of machines “detracts somewhat from the idea that these
places should be considered bingos and makes them seem more like casinos.”46
Bingo halls replicated Brazil’s well-entrenched class divisions. In keeping with their
casino-like attributes, bingos were mostly patronised by wealthy, well-educated men in the
country’s richest areas although they certainly attracted others as well, including older women
and men. Pervasive disregard of some aspects of law was manifested through the bingo halls
dispensing of cigarettes and the prevalence of smoking within them. 47 But this form of petty
illegality hardly accounts for the reputation that the bingo hall had acquired by the time the
market closed, when, according to the Parliamentary Inquiry, half (51 per cent) of Brazil’s
population associated bingos with “criminal practices such as money laundering, tax evasion
40
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and increasing violence.”48 To understand why 43 per cent of Brazilians surveyed in 2006
would express the view that “bingo halls have no positive features,” 49 in effect, why the
regulation failed to ensure public confidence in the licensed bingo market, this article now turns
to the governance of Brazil’s commercial bingo sector.

II. THE RISE AND DEMISE OF COMMERCIAL BINGO
REGULATION IN BRAZIL
A. THE THREE PHASES OF BRAZIL’S COMMERCIAL BINGO
REGULATION
Brazil’s regulation of its bingo market can be divided into three phases according to how the
state wielded the illegality instrument. It lifted illegality between 1993 to 2000 to create a
market for lawful bingo; partially reapplied illegality from 2000-06, which restricted supply
and placed many bingo halls in a shadow zone of openly contested legality; and fully restored
illegality in 2007, driving the game underground. These latter shifts were justified politically
on the grounds that the bingo halls offered criminal networks places from which to launder
money, generate corrupt arrangements, and damage public security.
The bingo market was opened by Lei Zico, a law not about gambling as such but about
the democratisation and financing of sport. 50 Article 217 of the 1988 (post-dictatorship)
Constitution characterizes participation in sport as an individual right in Brazil and imposes
duties on the state to foster the exercise of this right, to respect the autonomy of sports
federations, to fund the practice of sports in education and some high performance sports, to
protect and incentivize the development of national sports, and to encourage leisure as a means
of promoting society. 51 Lei Zico was enacted in 1993 to give effect to these new constitutional
obligations. It sought to foster the development of sport and at the same time “to embed in the
arena of sports a predominant philosophy of ‘destatisation’ … eliminating state interference in
the internal business of sports clubs.” 52 To that end, Article 57, which contains the only
reference to bingo in the legislation, authorises state treasuries to permit sports organisations
to raise money for sports development by holding “a type of sweepstakes called Bingo, or
similar.”
Substantive rules on bingo governance and regulation were enacted in November 1993,
modified in 1998 by Lei Pelé,53 and again in 2000 by Lei Maguito.54 These rules created an
institutional framework for sports organisations to develop and market the game, covering
matters such as accreditation requirements for market entry, premises occupancy, licensing of
owners, operators and premises, returns to players and remittance of revenues to sports
development, and to pay for the regulator, reporting and accountability requirements, including

48

Ibid at 120.
Ibid.
50
Lei no 8.672/93.
51
Art 217, Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Câmara dos Deputados, online:
<livraria.camara.leg.br/direito-e-justica/constitution-of-the-federative-republic-of-brazil.htm> and in English at:
<constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf> [perma.cc/92YH-EHCD].
52
Dossiê Lei Zico, Brazil, Câmara dos Deputados, PL 965–1991 (Folha 3 da E.M. No 002, de 28 de fevereiro de
1991).
53
Lei No 9.615/98 (Lei Pelé).
54
Lei No 9.981/2000.
49

Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2018

160

Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 30 [2018], Art. 8

certification standards for bingo halls covering equipment, premises, licensees’ financial
standing, and records of compliance with safety, labour and consumer laws.
Lei Zico placed responsibility for financial supervision on the treasury departments of
Brazil’s 26 states and the Distrito Federal but made no provision to fund this regulatory work.
Lacking the expertise to govern the diverse businesses in the emerging bingo market, many
state treasuries delegated their regulatory powers to the organisations that ran state lotteries.
Regulatory activity across the country was quite uneven with no guarantee of effective
governance even in states with large bingo industries. In São Paulo, for example, the lotteryregulator … “just existed on paper drawn up by the Secretary of the Treasury … It never
worked … Entrepreneurs soon realised that what they did would not be monitored and that’s
what started the fragile relationship between bingos and public authorities.”55
Lei Pelé replaced Lei Zico in 1998 after corruption scandals occurred in states that
regulated substantial commercial bingo markets. It shifted regulatory authority over the bingo
market to the federal government, which then delegated the responsibility to the National
Sports Development Institute (INDESP). This small agency lacked the resources to regulate
the bingo economy effectively. It therefore contracted with existing state regulators to continue
their local supervisory arrangements, including some whose corrupt relationships with bingo
entrepreneurs were known.56 Regulation at the state level persisted in about half of Brazil’s 26
states and the Distrito Federal, with the effect that conditions were ripe for established corrupt
relationships to continue. INDESP proved to be no more effective or incorruptible than the
states that regulated Brazil’s bingo halls. In the wake of a jurisdictional conflict over the
regulation of electronic gaming machines in states to which INDESP had contracted out its
regulatory powers, 57 evidence emerged of systematic bribery of INDESP staff to buy their
support for further increases in the number and type of electronic machines permitted in bingo
halls.58
Brazil’s federal government responded to this scandal by closing down entry to the bingo
market in 2000, a mere seven years after it had opened the market. Lei Maguito withdrew the
authority to grant new bingo licences but allowed established bingo halls to continue until
expiry of their (renewable) licences. This legislation also transferred responsibility for
supervision and surveillance from INDESP to the CAIXA, which ran the successful federal
lotteries and in 2001 INDESP was shut down.59 At the end of 2002, all federal licences that
had been given to bingo establishments expired.60
Expiry of the federal licences did not immediately end Brazil’s commercial bingo market
but instead moved the sector into the second phase of partial (il)legality. This phase relied on
two techniques to secure continuity of the market: First, states that had regulated bingos within
their jurisdiction since legalisation on the basis of their own enabling legislation carried on, in
55
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effect exercising the federal government’s power to regulate the bingo sector. Second, some
state courts became involved in the bingo market after Lei Maguito when owners asked judges
to issue injunctions (“liminares”) to extend expired licences.61 As there was little consistency
in the exercise of this judicial power, bingo hall stakeholders found it difficult to understand
what was required to succeed in court. Moreover, because of the lucrative nature of the
businesses affected—and the substantial losses occasioned by closure—there were suspicions
that judges were being corrupted to secure licence extensions. As one interviewee observed:
“there were judges who allowed bingo halls to operate normally … And there was speculation
that these injunctions would cost R$1 million, 2 millions, 5 millions… [T]hose who got these
decisions felt like they had won the lottery.”62
Yet another corruption scandal erupted in 2004. This time, the misconduct was that of an
associate of a very close adviser to then President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (Lula), and the
payment the associate had solicited (two years before the video of the transaction surfaced)
was from a well-known entrepreneur of both bingo and the illegal jogo do bicho. The
entrepreneur was asked to finance political campaigns for the governing Workers’ Party (PT).63
A swift assertive response to this scandal was called for because of the damage it caused to the
Worker’s Party which had risen to power in 2003 with a commitment to stamp out corruption.
Initially, Lula tried to ban the operation of bingos and slot machines across the country
by issuing a presidential decree. This 2004 response failed, however, because Brazil’s National
Congress refused the endorsement that was required to bring the decree into effect.64 Reprieved
by Congress, courts in some states—notably São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul—continued to
issue discretionary injunctions to extend bingo licences.65
Three events during 2006-7 formally ended commercial bingo in Brazil. First, specialised
police and prosecutorial offices, established as part of a national strategic response to money
laundering and corruption, exposed the corruption of state courts that had been issuing
injunctions to extend bingo licences since the 2000 enactment of Lei Maguito.66 This exposure
eroded confidence in the integrity of court processes and increased the urgency of the perceived
need to create an effective response. Second, Brazil’s Constitutional Supreme Court affirmed
the federal government’s exclusive power over gambling regulation, rendering
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unconstitutional the decisions of the state governments and courts to extend bingo licences.67
Third, a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, the CPI dos Bingos, was established to
investigate Brazil’s bingo houses, with an emotive justification:
Organised crime and gambling are ‘conjoined twins’ … Since the very beginning
in 1993 the bingo halls have rendered a disservice to the Nation… [U]nder the false
mantle of contributing to the funding of sports clubs, some of these entities have
been used to launder money derived from criminal activities … The bingo halls
have as investors—sometimes hidden—known criminals who often represent the
interests of international mafia organizations.68
After extensive investigation, the CPI dos Bingos concluded that organised crime
businesses—both domestic and international—had indeed captured much of the Brazilian
bingo market and used bingo halls as places in which to launder money, negotiate criminal
conspiracies, and corrupt executive power from federal to municipal levels. 69 The inquiry
nevertheless recommended that the bingo sector should remain lawful, albeit with a
significantly strengthened regulatory infrastructure. That recommendation was not
implemented, however, as the state chose instead to terminate the market.
Commercial bingo did not end in Brazil after the reversion to illegality, but it became
less visible as privately-owned businesses took to offering the game through clandestine bingo
halls, mobile and online modalities. 70 It appears to be widely played: an industry expert
estimated, for example, that between 200 and 250 clandestine bingos continue to operate in
Brazil71 while a public prosecutor working in a city that had a vibrant bingo sector during
legalisation reported that several years after the end of legalized bingo:
… [W]e had about ten illegal bingo halls that were working simultaneously in [the
city]. So I went there and closed them and the next day they reopened. I tried as a
strategy to ‘de-capitalise’ illegal bingo halls, seizing everything they used to
operate the bingo. We sometimes took 300 or 400 chairs, armchairs and tables.
Even doing this, some bingos were still very fast to reopen … which shows that
they really had a lot of capital to finance the reopening of these locations.72
Ten years after the restoration of illegality, the state’s positioning of the game as outside
the law continued to be fiercely contested: Industry lobbyists advocate the revival of a
commercial market, drawing on, inter alia, recommendations of the CPI dos Bingos and wellrehearsed claims that have succeeded elsewhere about its potential contributions to government
revenue streams.73 Within the legislature, attempts have been made to replace prohibition with
a liberalised regulatory instrument.74 Since October 2017, several investors, claiming to act on
67
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the authority of state court decisions, have opened (and then been quickly forced to close) bingo
halls in Porto Alegre, a city that had sustained a thriving bingo market during the era of
legalised play.75

B. WHY DID BRAZIL’S BINGO MARKET FAIL?
Several aspects of the regulation influenced how Brazil’s bingo halls developed and eventually
contributed to the sector becoming engulfed by scandal. The first concerned the capacity of
bingo owners and operators to meet regulatory standards. It became clear within months of the
1993 enabling legislation that the sports clubs and federations that had been considered its
likely beneficiaries lacked the business acumen to develop bingos, the capital to invest in the
bingo halls and the administrative and management systems to meet basic regulatory standards.
Regulators responded to this problem by permitting sports organisations to partner with
commercial investors in bingo halls and share the revenues. According to a former bingo
owner, “the [regulatory] system they approved was not a good fit for the plan [to stimulate
sports development] because there were so many certification requirements.”76 The regulations
did not take account of the impact of certification requirements related to the number of
employees or scale of operations on large sporting organisations; consequently some of
Brazil’s best known sporting clubs, which legalization was intended to support, were
essentially priced out of entry to the bingo market because of the cost of obtaining certification
to operate a bingo facility and sometimes also the cost of paying outstanding tax liabilities.77
Although smaller clubs might have had similar types of debts and obligations, the sums
they owed normally would be much lower so that entrepreneurs could pay for the necessary
certificates to develop a bingo hall in collaboration with a small sports federation. One
interviewee commented for example, that: “it happened all the time. Licences were obtained
in partnership with small sports rather than the big sports clubs that the legislators had
envisaged.”78 Evidence reported by the CPI dos Bingos confirm that small sports benefited
disproportionately from the bingo halls. Niche activities such as boxing, rowing, and sailing,
which have relatively few participants in Brazil, were each supported by one of the sixteen
bingo halls visited by Inquiry investigators. By contrast, fewer than half of the bingos supported
football, which is by far the most popular sport in Brazil, practiced regularly by more than 13
million players—and millions more occasionally—and feature a number of very large sports
clubs. Other popular Brazilian sports, including volleyball, judo, futsal, capoeira, and surfing,
did not appear at all amongst the beneficiaries of the bingos that the CPI dos Bingos visited.79
Capacity problems were exacerbated by regulatory requirements about places of play.
The 1993 decree required bingo halls to be established as large-scale businesses, with a
minimum occupancy of 500 seats, and to be fully equipped with closed-circuit TVs, high
quality sound, and machine-based drawing systems. These provisions were intended to contain
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the risk of fraud and ensure that the new bingo businesses were sufficiently well-capitalised.
Bingo halls thus demanded substantial investment at a level well beyond the reach of most nonprofit sporting associations and their development also required large-scale effective marketing
to secure an adequate return on investment. Many bingo developers viewed EGMs as the
solution to ensure sustainability of the bingo hall. To those favouring expansion, the regulation
of gaming machines became the focus of lobbying to remove regulatory controls on the number
of permissible machines in a bingo hall.80
Bingos attracted, among others, entrepreneurs from Brazil’s lucrative illegal gambling
sector as investors (as well as consumers of gaming and leisure services). By the mid-1990s,
some owners of large jogo do bicho franchises had accumulated considerable capital from
trafficking as they had taken advantage of the post-dictatorship opening up of Brazil’s economy
and borders to diversify into businesses based on illicit flows of finances, services and goods
(such as narcotics, guns, money and cigarettes) across Brazil’s extensive borders. 81 These
criminalized trades generated huge revenue streams that then had to be integrated into the
legitimate economy for their value to be realised. As cash intensive businesses that dealt largely
with anonymous transactions in exceptionally high frequencies and volumes, the commercial
bingo halls offered good opportunities to launder money, particularly through the gaming
machines and in-house financial services. Bingo house cheques, loan services, foreign
exchange facilities and convertible value instruments such as gaming machine chips, vouchers
and ticket in/ticket out (TITO) systems could be used to trade illicitly-obtained funds for cash
with a traceable source.82 Bingo halls thus appealed to entrepreneurs of unlawful businesses
because they created ways to spend, trade, and invest the proceeds of crime that mask its origins
and convert proceeds into apparently legitimate funds.
Collusion with bingo hall staff opened up other ways to generate ostensibly “clean”
money from illicitly obtained funds. Employees could be bribed to tamper with gaming
machines or to conspire with clients in constructing false identities and they could be enticed
to ignore customers who “smurf” on behalf of clients by performing multiple small transactions
in amounts below threshold requirements for reporting of suspicious activity.83 According to
the CPI dos Bingos, the most common forms of collusion in Brazil were the purchase of
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“winning” cards outside the draw and the over-stating of prizes.84 The former practice was
particularly popular because the cards showed taxes as deducted at source so that the purchaser
immediately secured documentary record of legitimacy that could be attached to the illicitly
obtained funds.
Investment in bingo halls and equipment emerged as another key money-laundering
strategy pursued by criminal networks.85 Legalisation created new ways to insert cash into the
formal economy through wages, taxes, rent, and the costs of upkeep of premises. Successful
management of legalised bingo halls also facilitated the laundering of reputation because it
legitimated entry into influential networks and afforded investors access to legal institutions
for dispute resolution unavailable to illegal businesses. These resources of legitimacy and
access created by legalization of the bingo hall then served as a foundation for investors with
additional business interests in criminalized flows of other goods and services, such as
narcotics, arms, and finance, to corrupt political, executive, and judicial institutions within
Brazil.86
The CPI dos Bingos described three types of schemes by which entrepreneurs of illegal
gambling and other criminalized networks and actors, including those from outside Brazil,
invested illicitly-obtained funds into Brazilian bingo halls. One scheme entailed outright
ownership of a bingo operation, concealed behind layers of property relations, which were then
registered in the names of third party “straw persons” (testas-de-ferro), often people of modest
means: Brazilian and Spanish criminalized networks were said to be significant actors in this
type of scheme.87 Foreign investors, from Italy, France, and Spain, apparently dominated the
second scheme, which monopolised the importing of electronic gaming machines through
complex networks of off-shore companies, tax havens, and dummy businesses headed by
“front-men.”88 Supplying bingo halls was very much secondary to this scheme as its main
purpose was to launder illicit capital flows from international narcotics trafficking.89
The third scheme grew out of the extortion of tolls from bingo halls by the entrepreneurs
of local illegal gambling businesses—a practice that began shortly after legalisation. Some of
these entrepreneurs then diversified into trade in lucrative EGMs within Brazil. They initially
leased the machines to the legitimate partnerships between sports clubs and commercial
managers that operated the bingo halls. Illicitly obtained money that had been invested in
acquisition of the machines would then be returned in the form of legitimate receipts and rent
from their use. By 2006, such arrangements had developed to the point that some bingo halls
had been absorbed into large criminal conglomerates often with interests in multiple illegal
trades. The conglomerates were dominated by members of Brazilian criminal networks and the
CPI dos Bingos found well-established associations between jogo do bicho entrepreneurs and
the bingo industry in the Distrito Federal and Goiás (the state in which the Distrito Federal is
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located), and in the two states with the largest bingo sectors, Rio Grande do Sul and São
Paulo.90
In addition to facilitating corruption and the injection of dirty money into the economy,
Brazilian bingos were considered to be destabilizing presences in urban settings when the
criminal networks that had invested in them were perceived to conduct narcotics and guns
trafficking in the same neighbourhoods as the bingo halls.91 And as these illegal trades became
more visible on the streets, so too did the violent extra-legal enforcement methods practiced by
criminalized organisations to secure transactions and territories for distributing their goods and
services. 92 Thus, in 2006, the CPI dos Bingos found that some 50 per cent of Brazilians
associated legalized bingo with increased violence as well as money laundering and tax
evasion—7 per cent singling out increased violence as its most significant negative effect.93
These findings about the regulation of bingo halls indicate that Brazil closed its bingo
market not so much because of concerns about harm to players or to suppress play as such, but
rather to contain the risk to the public interest that the bingo hall had become. While the risks
of corruption and violence that the Brazilian state sought to address through reversion to
illegality may be evident, its choice of this stance merits comment. Illegality was restored
ostensibly because of the state’s inability to control—through less repressive regulatory
instruments and techniques—the flows of illicitly-obtained funds into the bingo hall and funds
derived from lawful bingo that were deployed to unlawful ends outside the hall. In practice,
however, regulation through instruments such as illegality tends to produce crime rather than
to suppress it and over-reliance on illegality as a regulatory technique, especially against the
trades and transactions encompassed by “vice” and other economic crimes, risks eroding
respect for the law and public confidence in a state’s capacity to exert control; and it also
expands the activities subject to informal and extra-legal means of control including violence.94
The question thus remains of why Brazil chose reversion to illegality, which tended to
exacerbate the problem that the state sought to resolve instead of attempting to develop a
stronger, more effective regulation of a legal bingo market?95
One possible explanation derives from expressive aspects of illegality. Even if the
criminal instrument does little to reduce a particular site of criminality risk, it nonetheless
remains a powerful symbol and means to communicate state power. In relation to crimes
created to control cross-border flows of goods, services, and capital, the communication work
that the criminal instrument does may be directed out towards the international community,
which over the past thirty years has acted particularly assertively to demand that states
criminalise financial flows, as much as it is directed in towards the local one.
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III. THE
CONTEXT

INTERNATIONAL

POLITICAL

ECONOMY

Brazil’s bingo halls were local institutions and the corruption problems they generated were
manifested within a national setting. Notably though, many of the institutions and instruments
that Brazil deployed to reimpose illegality had their origins in or were influenced by
international norms and standards. Consideration of the international context therefore may
provide insight into what the Brazilian state gained from reversion to illegality as its primary
regulatory instrument for the bingo hall.
Three elements of that context are important to the legalisation and subsequent recriminalisation of Brazil’s bingo halls. The first is the opening of Brazil’s economy, especially
its borders, during the 1990s and into the 21st century as the economic plans of the first postdictatorship presidents strove to reintegrate the country into the global economy. The second
element is the emergence of circumstances that held out the tantalising prospect of Brazil
attaining its longstanding historical aspirations to be regarded as an influential country that
wields soft power internationally. The third important element is the proliferation of
international instruments to criminalise flows of finance and of disfavoured goods and services.
These elements are interconnected. Brazil’s aspirations to be seen as globally significant
were strengthened by the trade deals opened its borders; and its newly opened borders both
challenged and inspired the government to accede to international instruments that demand the
deployment of criminalisation to disrupt cross-border flows of impugned goods, services, and
capital. Transposition of the international treaties into domestic law provided a framework and
resources to assist with the management of borders and as such to strengthen an aspect of
sovereignty that is conventionally understood in terms of a state’s control over entry and exit
from its territory. That international context also afforded Brazil an opportunity to demonstrate
its capacity to internalize emerging international norms and standards about financial flows, to
collect financial information, and to use the information to discipline domestic institutions and
markets. 96 By showing that it could act responsibly and effectively against illicit financial
flows, Brazil then strengthened its claims for influence in relation to global initiatives to
construct financial security as a pressing international concern.
The following subparts elaborate on these claims. The first summarises evidence from
early in the 21st century of the success of Brazil’s ambitions to wield soft power. The second
subpart turns to the developing international order on the criminalisation of financial flows that
stem from illegal sources or are deployed to nefarious ends and considers how norms and
standards adapted from this international order related to aspects of bingo regulation in Brazil,
especially its reversion to illegality.

A. LOOKING OUT: THE QUEST FOR ‘SOFT’ POWER AND
INFLUENCE

This capacity might be considered, drawing on Foucault, a more “governmental“ form of sovereignty. Marieke
de Goede, analyses the exercise of this type of sovereignty in relation to financial flows in Speculative Security:
The politics of pursuing terrorist monies (U of Minnesota Press: 2012).
96
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Brazil’s longstanding desire for international recognition as a significant actor in world affairs
is well-documented.97 According to Soares de Lima and Hirst, for example, “Brazil’s major
foreign policy aspiration has been to achieve international recognition in accordance with its
belief that it should assume its ‘natural’ role as a ‘big country’ in world affairs.”98 As these
authors—and others—observe, this aspiration to wield soft power, at least through “a middle
ground international role,”99 is in part a consequence of its size and resources. Brazil is a big
country in terms of territory, population, and economy.100 It has more international borders
than all other countries apart from Russia and China and one of the world’s longest coastlines.
It is the state with the largest territory in the Southern hemisphere and is custodian of much of
the world’s biodiversity.101
Brazil has sought to realise its aspirations to soft power through active engagement with
high profile political institutions and international events. It is a founding member of the UN,
an energetic campaigner for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council to which it has been
elected 10 times (second only to Japan); and since 1955, by well-established tradition, Brazil
speaks first at the general debate of the UN General Assembly.102 Brazil founded the World
Social Forum and has hosted more of its meetings than any other country.103 Over time, the
country has reached a stage where it is often included in clubs and decision-making fora for
significant states but it has not had a lot of success in securing leadership positions in
organisations created and dominated by rich and historically-influential states.
An important boost to Brazil’s leadership ambitions occurred in 2001 when a paper about
global economic developments included the country in a group of four “emerging market”
economies that were likely to be key agents of global growth in the 21st century. Forecasting
that the real GDP growth of Brazil, Russia, India, and China would exceed that of the G7 in
2001 and 2002, this paper heralded the arrival of the construct of the “BRICs countries” in
international political economy discourse.104 Noting how little commonality there is among the
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BRIC countries, and how disinterested India and China were in the classification, Rohter
describes the grouping—with some justification—as an artificial construct invented as a
Goldman Sachs marketing exercise,105 but it was subsequently accepted as meaningful.106
Brazil’s inclusion among the BRICs stemmed from changes in its economy that had
occurred in the late 1980s after the restoration of democracy. Economic reforms to privatise
state enterprises and curb Brazil’s monstrous rates of hyper-inflation were initiated by
Fernando Collor de Mello, the first elected president to take office in Brazil after the 1988
constitution.107 These reforms were substantially overhauled and redeveloped as the “Plano
Real,” by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, first as finance minister to Itamar Franco, Collor de
Mello’s successor as President, and then carried on through Cardoso’s own tenure as president.
Taken together, the reform programs have resulted in the privatisation of more than 100 state
enterprises, a dismantling of barriers to foreign investment, the end of hyper-inflation, and
substantial diversification of Brazil’s economy. 108 They enabled twin track development of
industrial and agricultural sectors and facilitated exploitation of the country’s extensive and
varied resources including its young, economically active population as well as the land, water,
and vast deposits of minerals for which Brazil is known. These economic policies, which
largely continued through Lula’s presidency, over fierce objections of many members and
supporters of the Workers Party that he led, have brought considerable capital investment into
the country since the early 1990s.109 As an enormous economy that imports and exports capital,
Brazil also has become subject to scrutiny of the risks to financial stability and global security
that its capital flows potentially may create or exacerbate. Because of its size and significance
to the global economy, Brazil’s relationship to international regimes for managing the risks of
financial flows was, by the start of the 21st century, increasingly considered important.110
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B. LOOKING INWARDS: PERCEPTIONS OF BRAZIL AND GLOBAL
CRIMINALITY RISK
Co-extensive with the opening up of its borders and the influx of foreign capital, Brazil became
integrated into an emerging “anti-money laundering transnational order” governing flows of
impugned capital between and within nation states. Launched in 1988 as part of a US-led “war
on drugs,” this evolving collection of global and local norms, institutions, interests, and
practices has developed into a core area of contemporary transnational regulation.111 The first
international instrument to include provisions to combat money laundering is Article 5 of the
1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances. 112 While the scope of this instrument is limited to the proceeds of narcotics
trafficking, the treaty introduced mandatory measures that have become the bedrock of
international controls on illicit financial flows, including the confiscation of proceeds, enabling
the tracing of impugned funds through records held by banks and other firms, and obligations
to co-operate with other jurisdictions in confiscation and tracing processes. 113 Equivalent
international measures were extended to the financing of “terrorism” in 1999,114 to “organised
crime” and “transnational” criminal offences in 2000,115 and to “corruption” in 2003.116
Several international organisations are involved in development and implementation of
the international normative order that governs financial flows, the most significant of which is
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—also known by its French name, Groupe d’action
financière (GAFI)—an intergovernmental organisation that began life, essentially, as a club of
wealthy, influential nations, at the 1989 G-7 Economic Summit in Paris. 117 The FATF
generates normative standards to combat money laundering (and financing of terrorism),
111

Machado, supra note 110.
E/CONF.82/14.
113
This article requires States parties, inter alia, to adopt measures to enable (1) confiscation of the proceeds of
narcotics trafficking; and (2) competent authorities to identify, trace, and freeze or seize proceeds (3) to empower
courts or other competent authorities to order seizure of bank, financial and commercial records be made available
or be seized; (4) not to allow bank secrecy to be used as a defence to seizure of records and to cooperate with
other jurisdictions as required. Brazil signed the convention on the day it opened for signature (20 December
1988), albeit with a reservation, and ratified it some 2.5 years later in July 1991. Confiscation/forfeiture of illegal
drugs and trafficking paraphernalia and their proceeds was already an established remedy in Brazilian law under
Decreto-Lei nº 1.455, of 7 April 1976 and Decreto-Lei nº 7560 of 19 December 1986.
114
“International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism” (1999) online:
<treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-11.pdf> [perma.cc/49UU-W5WN].
115
“United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime” (2000) online:
<unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro/UNTOC.html> [perma.cc/GJQ7-52DB].
116
“United Nations Convention against Corruption” (2003) online: <unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/uncac.html>
[perma.cc79WS-DAM2]; Brazil is also a signatory to the OECD OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which it ratified in 2000, OECD, “Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions” (2011) online: <
oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf> [perma.cc/Y4B8-ZLGR]; and the Organization of
American
States,
“Inter-American
Convention
against
Corruption”
online:
<oas.org/en/sla/dil/inter_american_treaties_B-58_against_Corruption_signatories.asp>
[perma.cc/DN763KED], which Brazil signed in 1996 and ratified in 2002.
117
It was founded with 16 members, which then increased to 28 after publication of the first edition of the money
laundering standards. Brazil, Argentina and Mexico became members in 2000, taking the total membership to 31.
The FATF currently comprises 35 member jurisdictions and 2 regional organisations (the EU and the drawn from
major financial centres across the world. Other international and transnational bodies, including the EU and the
UN, also monitor the development and institutionalization of the anti-money laundering international order within
nation states.
112

https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol30/iss1/8

171

Williams: All About That Place: The Curious Case of Bingo Liberalisation in

produces authoritative knowledge about practices for masking the origins (e.g. money
laundering) or destinations (e.g. terrorism financing or corruption) of impugned funds, and coordinates global responses to the threats posed by money laundering, and terrorism
financing.118 Its compliance machinery relies on processes of peer review, mutual evaluation
and naming/shaming and it has extended its reach while limiting its governance and decisionmaking membership by creating a distributed network of associated “FATF-style Regional
Bodies” that conduct peer reviews and mutual evaluation of countries within their regions.119
Brazil was not invited to join the FATF until 1999/2000, some ten years after the
organisation was founded and had published its standards. However, signs of the influence of
the norms it oversees appear in Brazilian law well before it became a member. Within two
years of being listed as “a [l]ocation in which action is needed to stem and prevent money
laundering in order to make headway into the international money-laundering problem,”120
Brazil had enacted a comprehensive anti-money laundering law, Lei No 9613/1998,121 that
essentially met FATF standards on money laundering and extended the international measures
to combat corruption. This law took effect in the same year as Lei Pelé, the legislation that
shifted regulatory authority over bingo halls to the federal government after corruption scandals
had damaged several of the state-based regulators of bingo halls. Notably, the bingo sector was
almost immediately targeted as a site for supplementary rule-making by the Conselho de
Controle de Atividades Financeiras (COAF), a financial intelligence unit established under the
new money-laundering law to meet the FATF standards for the gathering and processing of
financial information.122
After a generally successful assessment of its domestic anti-money laundering
regulation, Brazil joined the FATF in 2000.123 This marker of integration into the global antimoney laundering order occurred in the same year as an important milestone in its history of
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laundering, and added standards to combat the terrorism financing in 2001. It subsequently revised its standards
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bingo regulation: enactment of the law (Lei Maguito) that started the process of closing Brazil’s
bingo market.124 Over the ensuing years, as bingo entrepreneurs battled to keep their businesses
through court actions and lobbying state governments, the federal government developed a
sophisticated and proactive domestic architecture to combat money laundering and corruption,
including the Estratégia Nacional de Combate à Corrupção e à Lavagem de Dinheiro
(ENCCLA), the national strategy against money laundering and corruption, 125 specialised
Federal Courts (2003), prosecutors’ offices and federal police divisions, 126 and new
prosecutorial instruments. These institutions were actively and successfully deployed against
the bingo sector, for example, in operations to halt the corruption of courts where judges were
bribed to extend operating licences. Brazil underwent another FATF review in 2004/2005.
Noting that bingos were one of the more common methods of money laundering used in Brazil,
this evaluation nonetheless found Brazil largely compliant with the anti-money laundering (but
not Terrorism Financing) standards.127
The assiduousness and urgency with which Brazil engaged with corruption control and
anti-money laundering standards did not go unnoticed or unrewarded. In 2008, one year after
the country had reverted to illegality in the bingo sector, Brazil assumed the rotating presidency
of the FATF, the first South American country to play this role.

IV. CONCLUSION
This article has explored the regulation of commercial bingo in Brazil, looking at how the
sector developed under legalization and the state’s failure to develop a sustainable model of
regulation. Because this failure is unusual in the contemporary world and does not fit the
gambling proliferation thesis, the article has sought to identify distinctive aspects of Brazil’s
relationship with bingo and to understand the perceived benefits of its reversion to illegality.
Brazil closed its bingo market not because of harm to players or to suppress play as such, but
rather to contain the risk to the public interest that the bingo hall came to represent. This risk
arose from the property relations that constituted the bingo hall, including the ownership and
management of bingo businesses and equipment such as electronic gaming machines. Together
with the business relationships that bingo halls fostered, these relations, over time, became
channels for illegal funds and created threats to the integrity of public powers.
Through analysis of the places that bingo halls became, their place in Brazilian society and the
place of Brazil in a globalizing world, the article has generated new insights into factors that
may influence domestic policy choices about regulating gambling markets. The article does
not claim conclusively to explain why Brazil reverted to illegality rather than continuing its
search for a sustainable model of regulation—the associations the article has identified are as
yet correlations rather than causes—but the analysis has identified two key issues for further
research and development that may be of importance beyond the Brazilian case. First, it has
confirmed the importance of investigating the property and investment relations that constitute
gambling spaces and places. While much gambling research focuses primarily on consumption
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risks, in the case of Brazil, the more significant risks for understanding the fate of its regulation
concerned production of the bingo hall. Second, the analysis shows that consideration of the
international context of gambling regulation may yield valuable insights into national
regulatory decisions and processes, even in the case of bingo, a game that often is seen as
quintessentially local. While this article’s discussion of the particular significance and
influence of the international context to developments in Brazil is suggestive rather than
definitive, its intended contribution to the field is to stimulate debate and open up additional
lines of inquiry.
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